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Abstract
Using US data for the period 1967:5-2002:4, this paper empirically
investigates the performance of a Fed’s reaction function (FRF) that
( i )a l l o w sf o rt h ep r e s e n c eo fs w i t c hing regimes, (ii) considers the
long-short term spread in addition to the typical variables, (iii)
uses an alternative monthly indicator of general economic activity
suggested by Stock and Watson (1999), and (iv) considers interest
rate smoothing. The estimation results show the existence of
three switching regimes, two characterized by low volatility and the
remaining regime by high volatility. Moreover, the scale of the
responses of the Federal funds rate to movements in the rate of
inﬂation and the economic activity index depends on the regime.
The estimation results also show robust empirical evidence that the
importance of the term spread in the FRF has increased over the
sample period and the FRF has been more stable during the term of
oﬃce of Chairman Greenspan than in the pre-Greenspan period.
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11I N T R O D U C T I O N
Taylor (1993) shows that a simple rule (called the Taylor rule) based on
inﬂation and the output gap characterizes the evolution of the US Federal
funds rate well for the ﬁrst ﬁve years (1987-1992) of the term of oﬃce of
Fed Chairman Greenspan. Recently, a strand of literature (for instance,
Svensson (1997), Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999)) has shown that this rule
can be obtained from the optimizing behavior of a central bank that seeks
to minimize a loss function that includes expected deviations of the rate of
inﬂation from a target level and the output gap. Moreover, Rotemberg and
Woodford (1998a) derive a Taylor rule from optimizing individual behavior.
The aim of this paper is to study empirically the Fed’s reaction function
(FRF) that generalizes the Taylor rule with four additional features in order
to provide a better understanding of how US monetary policy has been
reacting to aggregate variables over a long period of time. First, the FRF
allows for the presence of switching regimes to capture asymmetries in the
reaction function.1 Second, the FRF considers the long-short term spread in
addition to inﬂation and a real activity index as a simple way of capturing
market expectations of both future real activity and inﬂation. Among others,
Fama (1990), Mishkin (1990), Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) and Estrella
and Mishkin (1997) have shown robust empirical evidence that the term
spread contains useful information concerning market expectations of both
future real activity and inﬂation and that the spread summarizes predictive
information that is not captured by the variables entering into a standard
Taylor rule. The idea of including the term spread (or some other element
related to the term structure of interest rates) in the FRF is not new. For
instance, Carey (2001) includes a 10 year bond yield. As pointed out by Carey
(2001), identifying an independent role for the term spread as a variable
t ow h i c ht h eF e dr e a c t si sd i ﬃcult because according to the expectations
hypothesis of the term structure the long-term rate and the spread should
anticipate movements in the short-term rates. Therefore, any response of
the funds rate to the spread may only reﬂect the ability of the long rate to
anticipate future funds rate movements.
Third, I use an alternative deﬁnition of general economic activity. The
economic activity index considered is the CFNAI-MA3. This index is the
three-month moving average of the Chicago Fed National Activity index,
which is computed using the methodology suggested by Stock and Watson
1There is recent empirical literature (for example, Dolado, María-Dolores and Naveira
(2003), Dolado, María-Dolores and Ruge-Murcia (2002) and Bec, Ben Salem and Collard
(2002)) that ﬁnds evidence of an asymmetric reaction function by the US Fed, among
other central banks.
2(1999).2 The CFNAI-MA3 is a monthly index, so it allows us to consider
monthly data instead of quarterly data, as is the case when a GDP measure of
economic activity is used.3 A ss h o w nb yS t o c ka n dW a t s o n( 1 9 9 9 ) ,t h i st y p e
of economic activity index is a good indicator of future inﬂation. Therefore,
the FRF is able to capture the presence of forward-looking components by
considering the CFNAI-MA3 and the term spread, which are not present in
the standard Taylor rule.
Finally, following Rotemberg and Woodford (1998b) among others,
interest rate smoothing is introduced into the FRF by considering the
lagged interest rate. There is recent empirical literature (for instance, Carey
(2001), Gerlach-Kristen (2002) Rudebusch (2002)) that studies whether the
interest rate smoothing evidence is the result of monetary policy inertia or
an unobserved variable problem.
I follow two approaches for studying the performance of the FRF. First,
I carry out a multiple time series analysis by estimating a three-state
four-variable Markov-switching vector auto-regressive model (MSVAR) that
includes the term spread, the short-term rate, inﬂation and the CFNAI-
MA3.4 This MSVAR builds upon the two-state bivariate MSVAR that
includes the term spread and the short-term rate, suggested by Ang and
Bekaert (2002) to replicate the non-linear dynamic patterns of short-term
interest rates found by the non-parametric studies (e.g., Aït-Sahalia, 1996).
This two-state bivariate MSVAR is also studied by Vázquez (2004) to analyze
the performance of alternative rational expectations equilibria in the context
2More precisely, the Chicago Fed National Activity index is the ﬁrst pricipal component
of 85 existing, monthly real indicators of economic activity. These 85 monthly indicators
can be classiﬁed in ﬁve groups: production and income (21 series), employment,
unemployment and labor hours (24 series), personal consumption and housing (13 series),
manufacturing and trade sales (11 series) and inventories and orders (16 series). Therefore,
neither the term spread nor inﬂation is considered in building the CFNAI-MA3. For more
details on this index and demostrations of how well it works both in forecasting inﬂation
and identifying recessions as deﬁned by the NBER, see also Fisher (2000) and Evans, Liu
and Pham-Kanter (2002).
3A number of studies consider an industrial production index in order to avoid this
shortcoming. However, the use of such an index can also be questioned on the grounds
that the share of domestic output represented by industrial output has decreased steadily
in all industrial countries, including the US, over the last 30 years.
4Two recent related papers are Sims and Zha (2002) and Valente (2003). Sims and
Zha analyze a 6-variable 3-state structural MSVAR using monthly US data that includes
a commodity price index, M2, the Fed funds rate, interpolated monthly real GDP, the
consumer price index and the unemployment rate. Valente (2003) analyzes a two-state
three variable Markov switching VAR that includes a short-term interest rate, expected
inﬂation and expected output using data from the four largest european economies, Japan
and US.
3of the term structure of interest rates.5 As pointed out by Ang and Bekaert
(2002, p.1244), considering term spreads in the short-term rate analysis helps
identiﬁcation both from an econometric perspective (term spreads Granger-
cause short rates) and from a modeling perspective (spreads are closely
related to short rates in most term structure models). Moreover, the inclusion
of both the term spread and the short rate in the MSVAR may help to
disentangle the predictive power of the term spread for funds rate changes
from its independent role in the FRF.
Second, I estimate the single equation described by the FRF allowing also
for the presence of a three-state Markov switching process characterizing the
parameters of the Fed policy rule. The inclusion of a third state in the two
approaches allows for a stringent test of the FRF stability results found below
during the term of oﬃce of Chairman Greenspan.
A comparison of the results from the two approaches allows us to assess
the robustness of the FRF empirical analysis. We believe that highlighting
the similarities and diﬀerences of these two approaches is currently of great
r e l e v a n c ea f t e rt h eh e a t e dd e b a t eo nt h er o l eo fV A R ’ si na n a l y z i n gm o n e t a r y
policy between Glenn Rudebusch and Christopher Sims (see Rudebusch
(1998a,b) and Sims (1998)). Interestingly, we ﬁnd that the main conclusions
of the paper are upheld by both approaches.
The estimation results show the existence of three regimes displaying
rather diﬀerent features. Two of the regimes are characterized by low
volatility and the remaining regime by high volatility. Moreover, the scale of
the responses of the Federal funds rate to movements in the rate of inﬂation
and the economic activity index is much smaller in the two low volatility
regimes than in the high volatility regime. In particular, the estimation
results show a strong connection between the periods characterized by major
shocks/high inﬂation (as was the case with the two oil shocks in the mid-
seventies and the ﬁrst half of the eighties, and also Volcker’s monetary
experiment in 1980-1983) and the high volatility regime where the Fed reacts
strongly to economic aggregates. Furthermore, the estimation results show
robust empirical evidence that the FRF, which includes a signiﬁcant term
spread, has remained stable in explaining the dynamics of the funds rate
during the term of oﬃce of Chairman Greenspan, in sharp contrast with the
pre-Greenspan period, when frequent switches between the three alternative
regimes show up and the role of the term spread was rather weak.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces and
5Ang and Bekaert (2002) use monthly data on 3-month short rates and 5-year long
rates of zero coupon bonds from the US, Germany and the UK whereas Vázquez (2004)
uses monthly data on 1-month US Treasury bill rate and US Treasury 20-year yields.
4estimates the three-state four-variable MSVAR model considered. Section 3
estimates the single equation FRF. The results from the two approaches are
also compared. Section 4 concludes.
2 THE MARKOV-SWITCHING VAR
In this section, I estimate a three-state MSVAR model that includes the
variables entering a standard Taylor rule (i.e., the short-term rate, the
economic activity index and inﬂation) and the term spread. Formally,
Zt = Υ(st)+B(st)Zt−1 + Ω(st)
1/2ξt, (1)
where Zt =( spt,r t,πt, e yt)0 and ξt ∼ N(0,I). spt = Rt − rt is the long-short
term spread, Rt is the long-term rate, rt is the short-term rate, πt is the
annualized rate of inﬂation (πt = 1
12
P11
i=0πt−j, πt = 1200(lnPt−lnPt−1) and
Pt is the consumer price index) and e yt is an index of economic activity that
aims to capture the cyclical component of output. The regime variable st is
either 1, 2 or 3 and follows a ﬁrst-order three-state Markov process with the
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where the row j,c o l u m ni element of P is the transition probability pij that
gives the probability that regime i will be followed by regime j.6 We estimate
the Cholesky decomposition Ψ(st) of Ω(st) where Ω(st)=Ψ(st)Ψ(st)0.
The short-term rate considered is the US Federal funds rate. The term
spread is deﬁned by the diﬀerence between the one-year Treasury constant
maturity rate and the Federal funds rate.7 T h ei n t e r e s tr a t ea n di n ﬂation
6The three-regime MSVAR (1) considered may seem quite restrictive but it is the
most the data can bear without extreme problems in estimation. Dealing with the three-
regime MSVAR already implies the cumbersome task of estimating 96 coeﬃcients. I also
estimate the three-regime MSVAR including two lags (this exercise involves estimation of
144 parameters!). The estimation results of the MSVAR with two lags are qualitatively
similar to those obtained estimating the MSVAR (1). Moreover, according to the Schwarz
information criterion, the MSVAR (1) is selected instead of the MSVAR with two lags.
The estimation results of the MSVAR with two lags are available from the author upon
request.
7Robustness exercises have been performed using other long-term rates to deﬁne the
term spread. The long-term rates considered cover almost the whole maturity spectrum
from the 3-month Treasury bill rate to the 10 year Treasury constant maturity rate. To
save space the results using other deﬁnitions of the term spread are not shown unless they
reveal relevant results.
5data were collected from the websites of the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis and the Bureau of Labor Statistics, respectively. As mentioned in the
Introduction, the economic activity index considered is the CFNAI-MA3.
The period studied runs from May, 1967 to April, 2002. Figure 1 shows the
plots of the main time series analyzed in this paper. A bird’s-eye view of
the Funds fund rate and inﬂation time series shows evidence of the Fisher
eﬀect; the nominal interest rate (roughly) moves one to one with inﬂation.
Moreover, the term spread and the economic activity index display a similar
dynamic pattern. As shown in Figure 2, the term spread leads the economic
activity index. Thus, the highest cross-correlation value is at the 7-lead
(that is, ρ(e yt+7,sp t)=0 .526) whereas the contemporaneous cross-correlation
is only 0.250.
The second equation of system (1) can be viewed as an FRF. We
believe it is appropriate not to include contemporaneous variables in the
Fed’s reaction function since monthly data is used in the estimation of the
alternative speciﬁcations. Arguably, this allows for a closer match between
the information set available to the researcher and real time data used by
the Fed at the time of implementing monetary policy. Work by Orphanides
(for instance, Orphanides et al. (2000)) has shown the importance of using
the information available to the central bank at the time the policy decision
was made.
The maximum likelihood estimation of the alternative Markov-switching
models considered in this paper follows the procedures suggested by Hamilton
(1994, ch. 22). The appendix brieﬂy summarizes these procedures.
6F i g u r e1 :T i m e sS e r i e sP l o t s
7Figure 2: Estimated cross-correlations of the term spread with lags and leads
of CFNAI_MA3
8Table 1. Estimation results for the three-state four-variable MSVAR
model (1).
Parameter Estimate Stand. error Parameter Estimate Stand. error
γ1(1) 0.2131 0.0446 b21(2) 0.3226 0.1411
γ2(1) −0.0772 0.0651 b22(2) 0.9542 0.0394
γ3(1) −0.0559 0.0722 b23(2) 0.1543 0.0446
γ4(1) 0.1230 0.0448 b24(2) 0.5329 0.1319
γ1(2) 0.5458 0.3279 b31(2) −0.1418 0.0430
γ2(2) −0.2609 0.3749 b32(2) −0.0201 0.0192
γ3(2) −0.1034 0.2282 b33(2) 1.0209 0.0205
γ4(2) 0.1614 0.1723 b34(2) 0.1236 0.0484
γ1(3) 0.0094 0.1384 b41(2) 0.1078 0.0403
γ2(3) −0.1993 0.1584 b42(2) −0.0284 0.0188
γ3(3) −0.0557 0.1139 b43(2) 0.0217 0.0202
γ4(3) 0.5035 0.1282 b44(2) 0.9374 0.0524
b11(1) 0.8286 0.0285 b11(3) 0.9028 0.0409
b12(1) −0.0440 0.0101 b12(3) −0.0027 0.0176
b13(1) 0.0219 0.0083 b13(3) −0.0136 0.0151
b14(1) 0.0308 0.0210 b14(3) −0.0449 0.0552
b21(1) 0.1085 0.0375 b21(3) 0.0172 0.0460
b22(1) 1.0273 0.0164 b22(3) 0.9931 0.0212
b23(1) −0.0254 0.0136 b23(3) 0.0275 0.0116
b24(1) 0.1936 0.0234 b24(3) 0.1603 0.0871
b31(1) −0.0587 0.0437 b31(3) −0.0052 0.0328
b32(1) 0.0205 0.0164 b32(3) 0.0299 0.0147
b33(1) 0.9769 0.0157 b33(3) 0.9964 0.0151
b34(1) 0.1005 0.0345 b34(3) 0.0738 0.0251
b41(1) 0.0983 0.0288 b41(3) 0.0238 0.0561
b42(1) −0.0105 0.0099 b42(3) −0.0546 0.0178
b43(1) −0.0381 0.0106 b43(3) 0.0290 0.0190
b44(1) 0.8815 0.0237 b44(3) 0.8703 0.0434
b11(2) 0.7110 0.0953 ψ11(1) 0.1777 0.0099
b12(2) −0.0309 0.0344 ψ12(1) −0.0237 0.0127
b13(2) −0.0641 0.0324 ψ13(1) 0.0251 0.0152
b14(2) −0.2937 0.0848 ψ14(1) 0.0811 0.0152
Notes: γi(st) denotes a generic element of vector Υ(st), bij(st) denotes a generic
element of matrix B(st) and ψij(st) denotes a generic element of matrix Ψ(st)0.
The symbol (*) denotes that the non-negative restriction is binding for the
corresponding parameter.
9Table 1. (Continued)
Parameter Estimate Stand. error Parameter Estimate Stand. error
ψ22(1) 0.2131 0.0446 ψ12(3) −0.0304 0.0339
ψ23(1) 0.0163 0.0376 ψ13(3) 0.0230 0.0297
ψ24(1) 0.0344 0.0243 ψ14(3) 0.1342 0.0352
ψ33(1) 0.2311 0.0164 ψ22(3) 0.2100 0.0216
ψ34(1) −0.0509 0.0144 ψ23(3) 0.1077 0.0373
ψ44(1) 0.1507 0.0089 ψ24(3) 0.0413 0.0321
ψ11(2) 0.8777 0.0908 ψ33(3) 0.2058 0.0201
ψ12(2) −0.6906 0.1379 ψ34(3) −0.0553 0.0385
ψ13(2) −0.0413 0.0602 ψ44(3) 0.2115 0.0372
ψ14(2) 0.0014 0.0465 p11 0.9660 0.0067
ψ22(2) 0.8949 0.1074 p12 0.0000 ∗
ψ23(2) 0.0307 0.0402 p21 0.0442 0.0166
ψ24(2) 0.1787 0.0413 p22 0.9246 0.0162
ψ33(2) 0.4403 0.0434 p32 0.0187 0.0082
ψ34(2) −0.1128 0.0419 p33 0.9449 0.0209
ψ44(2) 0.3607 0.0365 log
ψ11(3) 0.2131 0.0212 likelihood −59.038
We focus our attention on three aspects of the estimation results of the
MSVAR (1) displayed in Table 1. First, the volatility of innovations in each
regime. Second, the persistence of the system in each regime. Finally, the
estimates of the Fed funds rate equation (i.e., second equation of system
(1)) because it can be interpreted as a structural equation that describes the
Fed’s policy reaction function. The estimation results can be summarized as
follows. First, the volatility of innovations in the system (1) is much higher
in the second regime than in the other two, as can be shown by computing
the eigenvalues of Ω(1), Ω(2) and Ω(3). The eigenvalues of Ω(2) are much
larger than the eigenvalues of Ω(1) and Ω(3), which are of the same order of
magnitude.8 Therefore, regimes 1 and 3 can be identiﬁed as low volatility
regimes and regime 2 as the high volatility regime. Second, the persistence
of the system in each regime can be measured through the moduli of the
eigenvalues for the companion matrices B(1) (0.97808, 0.97808, 0.95300 and
0.80514), B(2) (1.01072, 0.92424, 0.84431 and 0.84431)a n dB(3) (1.01168,
0.92624, 0.91233 and 0.91233), showing that the three regimes exhibit a
similar degree of persistence. Third, the coeﬃcient associated with the
8More precisely, the eigenvalues of Ω(1) are 0.05776, 0.04569, 0.02553 and 0.01249,t h e
eigenvalues of Ω(2) are 1.69534, 0.40162, 0.21739 and 0.10510, and the eigenvalues of Ω(3)
are 0.08712, 0.07217, 0.03670 and 0.01646.
10lagged interest rate is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one in any regime at
any standard signiﬁcance level. This result is not surprising at all since the
lower bound for the estimated value for the smoothing parameter is found to
be around 0.73 using quarterly data (among others, see Rudenbusch (2002))
and this result implies a lower bound value of 0.9 (=0 .731/3)w h e nu s i n g
monthly data.9
In order to compare easily the estimation results of the second equation
of system (1) for the alternative regimes, we next display these results in
regression format (standard errors in parentheses):
Regime 1:
rt = −0.0772 + 0.1085spt − 0.0254πt−1 +0 .1936e yt−1 +1 .0273rt−1, (2)
(0.0651) (0.0375) (0.0136) (0.0234) (0.0164)
Regime 2:
rt = −0.2609 + 0.3226spt +0 .1543πt−1 +0 .5329e yt−1 +0 .9542rt−1, (3)
(0.3749) (0.1411) (0.0446) (0.0234) (0.0394)
Regime 3:
rt = −0.1993 + 0.0172spt +0 .0275πt−1 +0 .1603e yt−1 +0 .9931rt−1, (4)
(0.1584) (0.0460) (0.0116) (0.0871) (0.0212)
The estimation results show that the Fed funds rate signiﬁcantly responds
to all three variables in regime 2, whereas it only responds signiﬁcantly to
the spread and the economic activity index in regime 1. However, the funds
rate’s responses to the three variables are small or not signiﬁcant in regime 3.
Moreover, the estimation results show that the responses of the funds rate to
the rate of inﬂation and the economic activity index are signiﬁcantly larger
in the high volatility regime (regime 2) than in the other two.10 Furthermore,
the low volatility regimes are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in the way the funds rate
responds to the term spread and inﬂation. Thus, the funds rate’s response is
signiﬁcant on the spread but not on inﬂa t i o n( t h ep o i n te s t i m a t ei sa c t u a l l y
negative) in the ﬁr s tr e g i m ew h e r e a st h eo p p o s i t ei st r u ei nt h et h i r dr e g i m e .
9Notice that the point estimate of the smoothing parameter for state 1 is greater than
one. Several authors have shown that a smoothing coeﬃcient greater than unity has good
properties. Thus, Rotemberg and Woodford (1998b) show that this feature guarantees the
existence of a locally unique equilibrium. More recently, Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2003) show that a smoothing coeﬃcient greater than unity ensures global stability.
10Form now on, by saying that an estimated parameter is signiﬁcantly larger than other
I mean that the estimated value of the parameter is larger and that the 95% conﬁdence
intervals associated with the two estimated parameters do not overlap.
11The estimation results also show that the Fed funds rate’s response to the
economic activity index is signiﬁcantly larger than the response to inﬂation
in regimes 1 and 2 (the point estimate response in regime 3 is larger, but
not signiﬁcantly so). Should we interpret this ﬁnding as evidence that the
Fed cares more about output ﬂuctuations than inﬂation? No. As shown by
Stock and Watson (1999) the CFNAI anticipate inﬂation movements. Then,
this ﬁnding only reﬂects that the Fed reacts more to anticipated than current
inﬂation. Moreover, the standardized funds rate response to the economic
activity index is larger than the standardized response to the term spread in
all regimes.
In short, the estimation results provide empirical evidence of a diﬀerent
policy reaction function depending on the state of the economy. Thus, one
can conclude that the funds rate behaves in a smooth manner during periods
characterized by economic stability as in the ﬁrst and third regimes where
the scale of the responses of the funds rate is small. By contrast, the funds
rate responses are rather large in the second regime characterized by high
volatility.
Apart from the size of volatility and the scale of responses of the funds
rate, what are the other features characterizing the alternative regimes? In
order to answer this question, let us start by looking at Figure 3. This ﬁgure
shows three plots with the allocation of time periods for the three alternative
regimes based on the smoothed probabilities using the information over the
whole sample of size T (i.e., prob[st =1 |IT]) together with the annualized
inﬂation plot.11 Figure 3 clearly indicates that the funds rate dynamics are
characterized by frequent switches between regimes during the pre-Greenspan
period (1967:5 to 1987:8) whereas the term of oﬃce of Chairman Greenspan
can be entirely attributed to a single regime (regime 1), characterized by
low, stable inﬂation.12 Moreover, a strong connection between the periods
11Interestingly, the estimated smoothed probabilities displayed in Figure 3 are similar
to those found by Sims and Zha (2002) in their Figure 1 using a three-state six-variable
structural MSVAR (notice that the high volatility state is called regime 3 in Sims and
Zha, 2002). Moreover, the high volatility state estimated probabilities are similar to those
found by Ang and Bekaert (2002) and Vázquez (2004) in their Figures 2, respectively.
This ﬁnding suggests that the allocation of time periods between regimes is fairly robust
to alternative speciﬁcations of the MSVAR. Since the latent variable st is an exogenous
variable, one would be concerned if the estimated smoothed probabilities were very
diﬀerent under alternative MSVAR speciﬁcations (that is, st would be exhibiting some
sort of endogeneity if the smoothed probabilities depended on the MSVAR speciﬁcation).
12As stated above, moving from two to three states and then splitting the low volatility
regime in two diﬀerent low volatility regimes (regimes 1 and 3) allows for a more stringent
test of the stability results found in the two-state Markov switching analysis of Ang and
Bekaert (2002) and Vázquez (2004) during the term of oﬃce of Chairman Greenspan.
12Figure 3: Smoothed Probabilities of (1) and Inﬂation
13characterized by major shocks/high inﬂation and recession (as was the case
with the two oil shocks in the mid-seventies and the ﬁr s th a l fo ft h ee i g h t i e s ,
and also Volcker’s monetary experiment in the period 1980-1983) and the
high volatility regime. These ﬁndings are further conﬁrmed by looking at the
sample correlations of the smoothed probabilities of the three regimes with
inﬂation and the economic activity index. Thus, the correlation between
annualized inﬂation and the smoothed probabilities of regime 1, 2 and 3 are
−0.5022, 0.5822,a n d−0.0616, respectively. The correlation between the
economic activity index and the smoothed probabilities of regime 1, 2 and 3
are 0.0396, −0.2895,a n d0.3162. respectively.
Roughly speaking, we can conclude that, on the one hand, regime 1 and 3
are characterized by low volatility, but regime 1 can be also viewed as a state
related to low inﬂation whereas regime 3 is more related to expansions. On
the other hand, regime 2 characterized by high volatility is related to high
inﬂation and recession. Thus the nineties, being a stable and low inﬂationary
period, belong to the ﬁrst regime whereas the periods 1973-1976 (ﬁrst oil
crisis) and 1979-1983 (second oil crisis and the Fed’s monetary experiment)
are robustly attributed to the second, where monetary authorities are more
l i k e l yt os w i t c ht oa nactive policy regime where the scale of the responses
is larger than in the low volatility regimes. These conclusions are similar to
those drawn by Ang and Bekaert (2002, p.1257) and Vázquez (2004) using a
two-state bivariate MSVAR.
As mentioned above, a large body of literature developed in the late
1980’s and early 1990’s found evidence that the term structure helps to
predict future inﬂation and real economic activity as well. Interestingly, this
academic work took place just before the period when regime 1, characterized
by a signiﬁcant response of the Fed funds rate to the spread, became the most
stable and plausible regime ever. However, establishing causality between
t h e s et w oe v e n t si sd i ﬃcult since no severe recession has occurred since the
early 1980’s. The signiﬁcant Fed funds rate response to the term spread and
the stability of regime 1 in describing the term of oﬃce Chairman Greenspan
suggest that the Fed has paid more attention to the term spread in the last
ﬁfteen years than before, but this is also due to the fact that the Fed moved
to target the Fed funds rate directly after the October 1987 stock market
turmoil.











14Since the innovations of the interest rate equation are close to being
uncorrelated to the other innovations, the order of factorization makes no
diﬀerence in analyzing the impulse response functions of the Fed funds rate.
Figure 4 shows the estimated impulse response functions with upper
and lower two standard error bounds of the term spread, Fed funds rate,
inﬂation and the economic activity index for the term of oﬃce of Chairman
Greenspan.13 Responses are displayed over an expanse of 48 months. Looking
down a column we see the responses of a particular variable. For instance,
the graph in the third row and second column corresponds to the Fed
funds rate response to an innovation in the inﬂation equation. We observe
that the largest and most persistent responses of the funds rate are due to
innovations from the economic activity and term spread equations. Moreover,
a contractionary monetary policy shock (a positive innovation in the Fed
funds rate equation) is followed by a rise in the inﬂation rate. This eﬀect
resembles the price puzzle with the inﬂation rate instead of the consumer
price index. Usually, the inclusion of a commodity price index or other assets
prices in the VAR helps to mitigate this problem. The fact that an inﬂation
puzzle still emerges when including the term spread in the VAR together with
the large body of empirical evidence on the term spread ability to predict
inﬂation suggest that the cost channel of monetary policy proposed by Barth
and Ramey (2001) works.14
13We only show the impulse response functions for the Greenspan period because this
period is well characterized by a single regime. However, frequent regime switches appear
in the pre-Greenspan period, which implies that the impulse response functions are less
informative in the latter case.
14Barth and Ramey (2001) argue that a contactionary monetary shock may aﬀect
aggregate supply as well as aggregate demand. Thus, an increase in interest rates raises
the cost of holding inventories, which is a negative supply shock that increases prices and
reduces output. Under this view, the price puzzle is simply evidence of the cost channel
rather than evidence that the VAR is misspeciﬁed. See Walsh (2003) and the references

































































































































Figure 4: Impulse responses of the VAR for the Greenspan period
163 SINGLE EQUATION ESTIMATION OF
THE FRF
In this section, I estimate an FRF that allows for the presence of a Markov-
switching process characterizing the parameters of the rule and considers the
term spread and interest rate smoothing in addition to the variables included
in the standard Taylor rule. We call the single equation speciﬁcation of the
FRF augmented Taylor rule (ATR). Formally, the ATR is given by
rt = ρ0(st)+ρ1(st)spt−1 + ρ2(st)πt−1 + ρ3(st)e yt−1 + ρ4rt−1 + σ(st)ut, (5)
where ut is a standard normal random variable and st is either 1, 2 or 3
and follows the same process speciﬁed above. As pointed out above, we
study an ATR that only includes lagged variables since monthly data is used.
Arguably, this allows for a closer match between the information set available
to the researcher and real time data used by the Fed when implementing
monetary policy. Moreover, considering only lagged variables in the ATR
allows us a neater comparison with the estimation results of the FRF found
in the previous section using the MSVAR.
Table 2. Estimation results for the ATR (5)
Parameter Estimate Stand. error Parameter Estimate Stand. error
ρ0(1) −0.2335 0.0289 ρ4(2) 0.9182 0.0616
ρ0(2) −0.5833 0.5785 ρ4(3) 1.0222 0.0088
ρ0(3) −0.4625 0.0494 σ(1) 0.0916 0.0059
ρ1(1) 0.1613 0.0177 σ(2) 1.3278 0.1589
ρ1(2) 0.3787 0.1922 σ(3) 0.1037 0.0064
ρ1(3) 0.0939 0.0196 p11 0.9595 0.0080
ρ2(1) 0.0538 0.0068 p12 0.0013 0.0010
ρ2(2) 0.2411 0.0796 p21 0.0762 0.0175
ρ2(3) 0.0302 0.0091 p22 0.8408 0.0222
ρ3(1) 0.1852 0.0154 p32 0.0020 0.0019
ρ3(2) 0.7781 0.2749 p33 0.9546 0.0104
ρ3(3) 0.1780 0.0152 log 76.485
ρ4(1) 1.0221 0.0072 likelihood
Table 2 shows the estimation results for the ATR (5). The estimation
results are similar to those found above when estimating the MSVAR (1),
but some noticeable diﬀerences emerge. These results can be summarized as
follows. First, the volatility of innovations in (5) is signiﬁcantly higher in the
second regime than in the other two (i.e., σ(2) is signiﬁcantly larger than σ(1)
17and σ(3)). Moreover, σ(1) and σ(3) are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. Second,
the coeﬃcients associated with the lagged interest rate are not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from one in any regime, as was the case above when estimating
the MSVAR. Third, comparing the responses of the Fed funds rate to the
alternative variables displayed in Table 2 with those described in equations
(2)-(4) we observe that all qualitative conclusions hold. However, there is a
remarkable diﬀerence: there are signiﬁcant funds rate responses to inﬂation
in regime 1 and the term spread in regime 3, respectively, when estimating
(5).
Figure 5 shows that the two models ﬁt the actual path of the Fed
funds rate reasonably well. Moreover, comparing Figures 3 and 6, we can
observe that the two models provide similar allocations of time periods to the
alternative regimes. Thus, funds rate dynamics are characterized by frequent
switches between regimes during the pre-Greenspan period (1967:5 to 1987:8)
whereas the term of oﬃce of Chairman Greenspan can be almost entirely
attributed to regime 1, although for the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h a tt e r mf r e q u e n t
switches between regimes 1 and 3 are present when estimating the ATR (5)
that do not show up when estimating the MSVAR (1).
The estimated errors obtained from the MSVAR (1) and the ATR (5) are
highly correlated (i.e., the correlation coeﬃcient takes the value 0.924). This
result is a direct consequence of the low estimated correlation coeﬃcients
between the innovations in the MSVAR (1). Interestingly, the estimated
errors from the ATR (5) and the MSVAR (1) are rather much correlated than
the error terms from diﬀerent VAR speciﬁcations compared by Rudebusch
(1998).
The correlations between the smoothed probabilities obtained from
the ATR (5) and annualized inﬂation and the economic activity index,
respectively, are almost identical with those found in the previous section
with one exception: regime 3 shows a rather low correlation with the
economic activity index.15
Next I estimate the model imposing the restrictions that the term spread
does not determine the changes in the funds rate under any regime. The
likelihood ratio test statistic associated with the null hypothesis that the
changes in the funds rate are not determined by the term spread in any
regime takes the value 29.42. This statistic is distributed as a χ2(3),w h i c h
implies rejection of the null hypothesis at any standard signiﬁcance level.
I further estimate a parsimonious version of the ATR (5) imposing the
15The correlations between annualized inﬂation and the smoothed probabilities of regime
1, 2 and 3 obtained from the ATR (5) are −0.5039, 0.5803,a n d−0.0155 respectively. The
correlations between the economic activity index and the smoothed probabilities of regime
1, 2 and 3 obtained from the ATR (5) are 0.1251, −0.2536,a n d0.1134, respectively.
18Figure 5: Actual and Fitted Short-Term Rate
19Figure 6: Smoothed Probabilities of the ATR (5) and Inﬂation
20following restrictions: (i) the response of the Fed funds rate on its lagged
value is invariant across regimes (i.e., ρ4(1) = ρ4(2) = ρ4(3)), (ii) the
responses of the funds rate on lagged economic activity index are identical
in the two low volatility regimes (i.e., ρ3(1) = ρ3(3)) and (iii) the sizes of
innovations in regimes 1 and 3 are identical (i.e., σ(1) = σ(3)). The four
restrictions imposed by this parsimonious version of the ATR can also be
tested using a likelihood ratio test. The likelihood ratio statistic, which
is distributed as a χ2(4), takes the value 3.74. This statistic implies that
the restrictions imposed by the parsimonious ATR are not rejected at any
standard critical value.
Recent evidence reported by Rudebusch (2002) suggests that only term
spreads at the short end of the term structure (up to three-month Treasury
bill spread) are able to predict Fed funds rate changes. In order to disentangle
the predictive power of the term spread for funds rate changes from its
independent role in the monetary policy reaction function, we estimate an
ATR that includes two term spreads: First, the term spread between the 3-
month Treasury bill rate and Fed funds rate; second, the term spread between
the 1-year Treasury constant maturity rate and the 3-month Treasury bill
rate. Formally, this ATR is given by
rt = ρ0(st)+ρ1(st)sp
3m,ff
t−1 + ρ2(st)πt−1 + ρ3(st)e yt−1 + ρ4rt−1
+ρ5(st)sp
1y,3m





t−1 denote the spread between the 3-month rate and
Fed funds rate and the spread between the 1-year rate and the 3-month rate,
respectively.
The estimation results for the ATR (6) are displayed in Table 3. Before
focusing on the parameter estimates, notice that the ATR (6) becomes (5)
imposing the three restrictions ρ1(st)=ρ5(st) for st =1 ,2,3. Therefore,
we can test ATR (5) versus ATR (6) by carrying out a likelihood ratio test.
The likelihood ratio test statistic, which is distributed as a χ2(3) in this case,
takes the value 7.47. This statistic implies that the ATR (5) is not rejected
in favor of the ATR (6) at the 5% signiﬁcance level but is rejected at the
10% signiﬁcance level. Although there is only a marginal improvement in
splitting the spread between the 1 year rate and Fed funds rate into the two
spreads considered in ATR (6), we ﬁnd that the spread between the 3-month
rate and Fed funds rate is only signiﬁcant in the high volatility regime (state
2) whereas the spread between the 1-year rate and 3-month rate is signiﬁcant
in the two low volatility regimes (states 1 and 3). These ﬁndings suggest that
the term spread has an independent role in the FRF in the two low volatility
regimes whereas the signiﬁcance of the term spread in the high volatility
21regime is more related to the predictive ability of the term spread to detect
Fed funds rate changes.16
Table 3. Estimation results for the ATR (6)
Parameter Estimate Stand. error Parameter Estimate Stand. error
ρ0(1) −0.1583 0.0844 ρ4(3) 1.0090 0.0302
ρ0(2) −0.6825 0.5365 ρ5(1) 0.1852 0.0291
ρ0(3) −0.4043 0.0617 ρ5(2) 0.3133 0.3385
ρ1(1) 0.0117 0.1361 ρ5(3) 0.1053 0.0310
ρ1(2) 0.4798 0.2376 σ(1) 0.0831 0.0058
ρ1(3) 0.0291 0.0840 σ(2) 1.3328 0.1862
ρ2(1) 0.0600 0.0185 σ(3) 0.1073 0.0109
ρ2(2) 0.2388 0.0866 p11 0.9589 0.0172
ρ2(3) 0.0300 0.0164 p12 0.0024 0.0050
ρ3(1) 0.2047 0.0207 p21 0.0655 0.0279
ρ3(2) 0.7316 0.2806 p22 0.8369 0.0327
ρ3(3) 0.1880 0.0179 p32 0.0027 0.0037
ρ4(1) 0.9943 0.0371 p33 0.9484 0.0108
ρ4(2) 0.9438 0.0835 log likelihood 80.222
4C O N C L U S I O N S
This paper implements Markov regime switching procedures àl aH a m i l t o n
to analyze the stability of the Fed’s reaction function over the last thirty-ﬁve
years. The estimation results show the existence of three diﬀerent regimes.
Two of them (say regime 1 and 3) are characterized by low volatility and
the other (regime 2) by high volatility. Moreover, the scales of the responses
of the funds rate to movements in the rate of inﬂation and the economic
activity index are much smaller in the low volatility regimes than in the
high volatility regime. On the one hand, regime 1 is also associated with
low inﬂationary periods and rather large funds rate responses to term spread
movements whereas regime 3 is more associated with expansionary periods
than with low inﬂationary periods, although the evidence is much weaker
in the latter case. On the other hand, the high volatility regime is strongly
related to high inﬂation and recessions.
The estimation results also show robust empirical evidence that a Fed
reaction function that includes the term spread has remained relatively stable
16The estimation results for the rest of the parameters are similar to those obtained in
estimating the ATR (5), so we do not discuss them further.
22in explaining the dynamics of the funds rate during the term of oﬃce of
Chairman Greenspan. However, for the pre-Greenspan period the estimation
results of the Fed’s reaction function is unstable, showing frequent switches
between three rather diﬀerent regimes.
APPENDIX
This appendix brieﬂy summarizes the recursive algorithm implemented in
the maximum likelihood estimation procedure. I pay attention to the three-
state case considered in this paper. Let θ denote the vector of parameters.
Let b ξt/t denote the 3×1 vector containing the researcher inference about the
values of st (=1 ,2,3) based on data obtained through date t and conditional
on a given value for θ. Finally, let b ξt+1/t denote the 3 × 1 vector containing
the one-period forecast about the values of st+1 (=1 ,2,3)b a s e do nd a t a
obtained through date t. Hamilton (1994, chap. 22) shows that the optimal
inference and the one-period forecast can be solved recursively from the two
following equations:
b ξt/t =
b ξt/t−1 ¯ ηt
10(b ξt/t−1 ¯ ηt)
,
b ξt+1/t = Pb ξt/t
where the symbol ¯ denotes element-by-element multiplication, 1 denotes a
3×1 vector of 1s, P is the 3×3 transition probability matrix and ηt is a 3×1




















[Zt − Υ(st) − B(st)Zt−1]
0
[Ω(st)]
−1 [Zt − Υ(st) − B(st)Zt−1]},
for st =1 ,2,3.
The log likelihood function $(θ) for the data set evaluated at a value of










b ξt/t−1 ¯ ηt
´i
.
23The value of θ that maximizes $(θ) is found using the maximum
likelihood routine programmed in GAUSS. The Broyden-Fletcher-Glodfard-
Shanno numerical method is used to update the Hessian at each iteration of
the maximization routine.
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